Abstract: This paper discusses the notion of "Islamic Protestantism" as a vehicle to create a face of democratic and pluralistic Islam. Drawing from the works of some prominent Muslim reformists and Western scholars, it addresses in some parts the works of Indonesian scholars. The choice of democracy and pluralism as a main focus in this paper is based on the fact that these two issues, representing the basic ideological doctrines in the everincreasing globalized world, are not only fundamental doctrines of modern Western political philosophy but also now primary concerns of modern Islamic political thought. Inspired by the Christian Reformation, this piece tries to promote an idea of "Islamic Protestantism" by applying deconstruction and socio-historical approach as methods to understand Islamic discourses, texts, and history.
Introduction
In a time when the images of Islam as a religion of terrorism, extremism, despotism, authoritarianism, anti-pluralism, and mysoginism are scattered throughout Western countries and elsewhere, discussion about Islam as a resource for peace, nonviolence, democracy, pluralism, feminism, freedom, and other universal human values remains a significant challenge. Abu-Nimer once says, "For the right, Islam represents barbarism; for the left, Islam looks like a medieval theocracy; and for the center, it seems like a kind of
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Arab region "has been slower to democratize than other parts of the world and only 4 of 17 countries have multiparty electoral systems." 6 Other data to support Lewis' critiques can also be cited. They include: the military coup de'etat in Pakistan led by the General Parvez Musharraf; the growing extremist Muslim groups in Indonesia; the ongoing terror and violence in Sudan; and the conservative clerical backlash against Khatami's reform movement in Iran. These cases seem to strengthen some analyses saying that the Muslim world cannot be separated from the world of terrorism, violence, despotism, and authoritarianism. Regrettably these analyses do not only judge Muslims but also Islam as a religion.
Due to such cases, it is not easy to convince that Islam is a democratic, peaceful, nonviolent, and pluralist religion. Indeed there are some extremist Muslim groups from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, from London to Jakarta, who use the means of violence to terrorize people and to reach their goals and interests. 7 However, the acts they commit do not represent views and deeds of Islamic ummah (the Muslim society) as a whole. The reason is that in the Islamic world, as proved by some surveys, 8 most Muslims reject the use of violence and terrorism as committed by Muslim extremists.
Despite the fact that there are some fundamentalist Muslims who reject and do not recognize democracy, pluralism, and secularism, 6 UNDP, Freedom in the World 2001 World -2002 (New York, NY: Harper San Francisco, 2005) . 8 Take, for example, a poll taken in September 2006 by the Program on International Policy Attitudes. It found out that 94% of Iraqis had unfavorable view of al-Qaeda, with 82% expressing a very negative view. In six predominantly Muslim Arab countries, namely, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, as shown by a poll in 2005 conducted by an expert in Arab public opinion Shibley Telhami, the influence of al-Qaeda was also very weak finding that only 7% of respondents supported al-Qaeda's methods, and only 6% supported alQaeda's goal of creating a Muslim state in their home countries. See Christopher Preble, "War of the Worlds?," Cato Policy Report, Vol. XXVIII No. 6, November/December 2006. In Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country, as shown by the surveys' findings of the Indonesian Survey Institute, most Muslims also refuse violent ways of achieving goals. 9 The term "civic pluralism" refers to "a public culture and social organization premised on equal rights, tolerance-in-pluralism, and legally recognized differentiation of state and religious authority." See Robert W. Brill, 1996) . undergoing democracy, discussing the issues of compatibility or incompatibility between Islam and democracy is no longer relevant. 12 Bayat's findings, actually, only confirm and reinforce previous works done by both Muslim and Western scholars. In 2002, Anthony Shadid wrote Legacy of the Prophet describing the new emerging Muslim politics in the Middle East. The main argument of this work is that a "sea change in political Islam" 13 has taken place over the past twenty years. Mainstream Islamist groups are undergoing a maturisation process in terms of their political thought vis-à-vis society, the state, democracy, and nonviolence. Just like Bayat's study, Shadid also featured the phenomenon of H{ izb al-Wasat} in Egypt which welcomes non-Muslims (e.g. Coptic) and women within political structures, as well as is willing to work with non-Islamist party. 14 The new phenomena of "moderate fundamentalist" Muslims who are willing to engage with ideas of pluralism and democracy are also discussed by Ahmad Mousalli. In responding this trend, Mousalli states, "Moderate fundamentalist thinkers are not, of course, Western moderate democrats in the strict sense; however, they are indeed liberal and democratic enough in a context like the Middle East, which is plagued with nationalist totalitarian rules and traditional despotic kings." 15 The above explanation illustrates that the Islamic world is like a forest consisting of many different trees and branches. Al-Qaeda and other similar Muslim extremist gangs are only one of these "Islamic trees." Some Western scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Daniel Pipes, Anthony Dennis, and Robert Spencer have wrongly read Islam as a "tree", not a "forest". 16 Unfortunately, the "tree" they observe is merely an Islamic fundamentalism which is considered a menace for Western civilizations. They ignore the facts of democratic, pluralistic, peaceful, and nonviolent Islam scattered across Muslim world today 17 and in the past. 18 On the contrary, they only desire to engage with aspects of violence and authoritarianism within some groups of Muslims.
What I describe in the above paragraphs is just to show the fact of "two faces of Islam", as with other religions, referring to the ambivalence. On the one hand, Islam performs quite democratic, peaceful, and plural; and on the other hand, it presents a violent and anti-democratic face. This is the phenomenon of what Scott Appleby calls "the ambivalence of the sacred" or that of "good Muslim and bad Muslim" to borrow the book title of Muslim Ugandan thinker Mahmood Mamdani. 19 Islam is like a "virtual market" selling whatever human beings particularly Muslims need. Muslims can "purchase" whatever they want to. Through religious texts, historical backgrounds, and normative teachings, Islam "sells" universal worldviews and fundamental values such as inclusivism, pluralism, feminism, egalitarianism, freedom, democracy, humanism, and social justice. But
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Charles Kimball makes an interesting reason in his notion of "when religion becomes evil." He argues that there are five warning signs of "when religion becomes evil." First, when the adherents of religion claim their teachings, texts, and doctrines as the only one truth. This is what theologians call as the claim of truth. Second is that when the adherents have blind-loyalty toward their clerics or imam. Third is when they desire to build a religious kingdom. Fourth is when religion allows and legitimizes evil deeds. Fifth is when the followers of religion command a holy war. 20 What Kimball argues is exactly what extremist Muslims have done. 21 In the case of Saudi, when the Wahha> bi> s were in power, terrorism and discrimination took place widely. As a result, undeniably, Wahha> bism can be seen as the main Islamic faction that hijacks Islamic teachings for supporting extremism and terrorisms. Furthermore, it has become the single greatest source of the impoverishment of contemporary Islamic thought. 22 Moreover, the ideological tenets of Wahha> bism and other Islamic wings of extremism like Salafism are strongly rooted in the Islamic texts and are heavily relied on Islamic traditions as their religious justification and "moral" legitimacy. Indeed, there are no religious texts that instruct directly the use of hostility, agitation, and violence. But, religious texts do inspire undemocratic policies and violent behaviors. 23 It is central, therefore, to review Islamic discourses and to carry out Islamic reform by promoting the so-called "Islamic Protestantism". 20 Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil? Five Warning Signs (n.: HarperOne, 2003) . 21 Indeed, the temptation to use religion for political objectives is powerful and the consequences can be devastating. This is what Scott Appleby has said as a "weak religion." Appleby said that religion becomes weak where religion as an independent cultural and social presence has been weakened, by neglect, oppression, a history of sub-ordination to a hostile or indifferent state, or by a losing struggle with forces of modernization. When religion becomes weak, it is easy to use it as a tool for violence. 
Soekarno, the leading advocate of Indonesian secularism and nationalism, during the nationalist movement era. 25 These Islamic reformation movements, according the secularist Syrian thinker Sadiq Jalal al-'Azm, had caused the establishment of a counterreformation movements led by the Ikhwanul Muslimin in 1928 (?) and similar movements. 26 In the Indonesian context, the modernist movements had stimulated the founding of the Islamic traditionalist organization, Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926, led by Syeikh Hasyim Asy'ari, the grandfather of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur).
Although in this piece I use the term "Islamic reformation," it does not mean to imitate the above modernist ideas. To some degree, I strongly criticize such ideas as "reformation" or "modernization" for some reasons. First, their notions for calling a reformation, meaning "return to the Qur'a> n and the Sunna" (the precedent of the Prophet), remain problematic because, as I mentioned before, some verses of the Qur'a> n are not invulnerable from criticism. Still, since the precedent of the Prophet Muh} ammad is scattered and recorded in many classical Islamic resources-and at times the records contradict from one resource to another-the critical question is: which Sunna that is more authoritative? Second, their commitment to strictly follow the Qur'a> n and the Sunna, as well as the model of the Prophet's companions (alsalaf al-s} a> lih} ) as the "authentic Islam" brings to the destruction of abundance of Islamic traditions, cultures, texts outside the Qur'a> n and the Sunna, and so forth which are regarded as "faces of Islam"-accordingly need to be purified. Thus, "reformation" means "purification." In responding to this group, Khaled Abou El Fadl states, "By emphasizing a presumed golden age in Islam, the adherents of Salafism (Abou El Fadl's term for this group) idealized the time of the Prophet and his companions, and ignored or demonized the balance of Islamic history. By rejecting juristic precedents and undervaluing tradition, Salafism adopted a form of egalitarianism that deconstructed any notions of established authority within Islam". 27 Third, their apologetic views are other weaknesses of this group. 25 See Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900 -1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973 It is crucial to notify that these "reformist groups" are basically a cluster of apologist Muslims who defended the Islamic system of beliefs from the onslaught of orientalism, westernization, and modernity by simultaneously emphasizing the compatibility and supremacy of Islam. Their claims as the "modernists" fundamentally aim at creating a fantasy view of "Islamic modernity." A large number of reformist groups responded to the intellectual challenges coming from the West by adopting pietistic fictions about the Islamic traditions. Such fictions avoided any critical evaluation of Islamic doctrines and traditions, and celebrated the imagined perfection of Islam. A common apologist argument was that any modern institutions and concepts including democracy, freedom, feminism, and pluralism were first and foremost invented by Muslims and had already existed within Islam. 28 Based upon the above description Abou El Fadl, once states that the nineteenth and early-mid twentieth century reformist Muslim movements led by Abduh, Afgha> ni> , Rid} a> , Shawka> ni> , San`a> ni> , Qut} b, Hawa, Mawdu> di> , Dahlan, and so forth, were a modified version of Wahha> bism, a puritan faction of Islam founded by Muh} ammad bin `Abd al-Wahha> b (d. 1792) in the late eighteenth century in Najd based on the creed of Ibnu Taymi> yah (d. 1328) and his disciple, Ibnu Qayyim al-Jauzi> yah (d. 1350). Abou El Fadl calls all of them the Salaf ("the predecessors") simply because they had suggested Muslims to strictly go behind the Prophet, his companions, and their successors. 29 Do their claims work in favor of "Islamic Reformation"? The answer is frankly, "no." It is because such "modernists" had projected ideals of "Islamic fantasy." Their claims to return to the Qur'a> n and the Sunna by devaluing secondary texts of classical Islam, in practice, do not work. In addition, `Abduh's claims (and other supporters) of "Islamic Protestantism" were far from the spirit of the Christian Reformation, which challenged the monopoly, supremacy, and 28 Beside the apologists, this cluster can be regarded the idealists, that is, those who advocate Islam is a religion that supports peace, nonviolence, pluralism, feminism, democracy and other universal principles. Islam is suitable for any area and time, wherever and whenever (al-Isla> m s} a> lih} un likulli zama> n wa maka> n). According to this group, Islam promotes pluralism and not sectarianism, advocates peace and not violence, teaches rah} mat (God's blessing) and not disaster, love and not hatred and certainly harmony, living peacefully and nonviolently and not terrorism. 29 El Fadl, The Great Theft, p. 75. religious despotism of the Catholic Church. While Luther declared "95 Theses," demanded freedom from the monopoly of interpretation and the supremacy of Church, and deconstructed the problematic verses of Bible which are not suitable for the spirit of modern time, these Muslim groups, in contrast, had rejected any effort of self-criticism towards Islamic doctrines, discourses, and the original texts of the Qur'a> n. As a result, these groups have participated in creating the emergence of ideas and practices of religious fundamentalism, conservatism, authoritarianism, and despotism within Islamic world. This is among the fundamental reasons of the rise of the "second wave" of "Islamic Protestantism" movement in the late twentieth century and present day Islam. In 2002, an Iranian scholar Hashem Aghajari embarked on a "project of Islamic Protestantism" by arguing that like medieval Christianity, Islam in the Islamic Republic of Iran had changed to become bureaucratized and hierarchical, and accordingly it needs fresh and radical ideas of reformation just like what had been done in the fifteenth Christianity. He described the "Islamic Protestantism" as a type of Islam characterized by rational, scientific, humanistic, thoughtful, intellectual, and open-minded. 30 Another eminent Muslim thinker joins in this camp is a Syrian author Muh} ammad Shahrour (b. 1938) . Anthropologist Dale Eickelman in his article, "Islamic Liberalism Strikes Back," states that a best-selling 1990 book by him, that is, Al-Kita> b wa al-Qur'a> n: Qira> 'ah Mu'a> s} irah ("The Book and the Qur'a> n: A Contemporary Reading"), "may one day be seen as a Muslim equivalent of the 95 Theses that Martin Luther nailed to the door of the Wittenberg Castle Church in 1517". 31 Through this book, Shahrour provokingly argues the need for reinterpretation of the Qur'a> n with new lens and modern social sciences such as linguistics and hermeneutics to grasp the whole picture of the Qur'a> n, and not through the prism of centuries of jurisprudence. Besides the above Muslim scholars, Sudanese Muslim academician and activist Addullahi Ahmed Na'im (b. 1946) also has echoed the idea of Islamic reformation. However, he stated that an Islamic reformation cannot be a belated and poor copy of the European Christian model of Reformation. Instead, it will have to be an indigenous and authentically Islamic process. By his book, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law, An-Na'im is an important voice for calling an Islamic reformation by reformulating the structure of "liberal Shari> 'ah" identified by granting civil liberties, respecting basic human rights, minority rights (particularly non-Muslims), equality before the law, and so forth. In an attempt to reconstruct this "new Sha'ri> a", he evokes the use of Mecca verses of the Qur'a> n, which is, according to him, more liberal, plural, and democratic. 33 Moreover, Ahmad Bishara, the chairman of the National Democratic Movement of Kuwait, can be regarded as the supporter of this movement when he said that the aim of the political party he established was to "reform Islam the way Martin Luther reformed the Catholic Church." Kenyan thinkers, Ali Mazuri and Alamin Mazrui, also pondered that "it would be particularly fitting if the Martin Luther of the Islamic Reformation turned out to be a woman, posting her 95 Theses of reform not on the door of a Wittenberg mosque but universally on the Internet". 34 A list of today's Muslim reformers supported the idea of "Islamic Protestantism" can be lengthened. However, the point of this piece is just to show that such an idea does not come down from an empty sky. Rather, it is deeply rooted within the history of modern Islam which emerges as an outcome of the practices of religious despotism and discrimination of extremist and fundamentalist groups throughout the Muslim countries. Furthermore, the idea of this "Islamic Protestantism" does not mean to do a "copy-paste" the fifteenth Christian Reformation" to current Muslim world or to conform the Protestant Reformation; rather, it is intended to take the "spirit" of the reformation in radicalizing Christian discourses and interpreting or deconstructing religious texts, and then try to apply it within Islamic contexts. Thus, the term "Islamic Protestantism" is only a name referring to the "liberal ideas" of Islam. The term "Protestantism" here also can be referred to two things: Protestantism (with capital "P") in the sense of the Protestant Luther or "protestantism" (within little "p") in light of "protest" to the forms of Islamic despotism, conservatism, fanaticism, authoritarianism, fundamentalism, etc. Another notice is that this idea of "Islamic Protestantism" is not in the sense of social movements and political actions, but more to that of intellectual endeavors.
In light of this framework, I am in line with the current Muslim reformers and I do support their intellectual endeavors in reforming and reconstructing Islam. However, at some point, I differ from them in terms of methodology of Islamic reformation. Generally, they use the discipline of hermeneutics (tafsi> r and ta'wi> l in the Islamic tradition) and enlarge the function of reason, mind, and thoughts ('aql) to interpret, rationalize, and finally idealize the Islamic religion. They elaborate the means of ijtiha> d (critical reasoning) as an intellectual medium to find out and defend the idea of compatibility between the values of Islam and those of modern civilization and culture. Indeed, I realize that such interpretation is always the challenge for a religious community. Nevertheless, their ideas are not able to answer and solve "the problematic texts" in relation to discrimination, violence, injustice, unequal gender relationships, intolerance, and so on. Accordingly, the use of hermeneutical methodology is not sufficient. Muslims need breakthroughs beyond the texts.
Their claims that the interpretation of the puritans is based on the lack of understanding of Islam and a very narrow perspective are incorrect and unfair. There are many puritans who have good knowledge in the Islamic tradition and in fact some of them are welleducated. The supporters of puritanical ideology, such as Ibnu Taymi> yah, Ibnu al-Qayyim al-Jawzi> yah, Abu> al-A`la> al-Mawdu> di> , Sayyid Qut} b, Muh} ammad Qut} b, Sa`i> d H{ awa, H{ asan Tura> bi> , Shaykh Bin Ba> z, and al-Zawa> hiri> are brilliant Muslim scholars who grasp Islamic sources/traditions and have written numerous scholarly works on various topics. For instance, Sayyid Qut} b has written a number of books including Fi> Z{ ila> l al-Qur'a> n which consists of thirty parts in six volumes, the book that has been used by worldwide puritanical groups as an intellectual basis of their movements. Ibnu Taymi> yah, Ibnu alQayyim al-Jawzi> yah and al-Mawdu> di> are also known as intellectual Muslim "giants." They had absolutely understood and were cognizant of what they had done in the interpretation of Islam based on the Qur'a> n, the H{ adi> th and other Islamic traditions. The core problem here is not the lack of understanding and narrow interpretation but it is due to the Qur'a> n itself which provides ambivalent statements! Here I suggest that Muslims should be "idealistic" as well as "realistic." I am aware that there are "two faces of Islam": good-bad, light-dark, peace-violence, justice-injustice and so forth. I am cognizant that there are two sides within the history of the Prophet Muh} ammad: the bright history as well as the dark history. 35 If Islam contains only positive sides as the idealists or apologists assume, the question is why does this religion breed the radical Muslim groups and individuals? On the contrary, if Islam just contains "negative teachings" as the "rejectionists" claim, why does this religion bears so many Muslims who devote their lives to peace building, democracy, pluralism, and human rights, and inter-faith dialogues?. 36 supported the ideas and movements against "the others" (Jews, Christians, non-Muslims, local beliefs, etc.) and provides only the teachings of anti-democracy, anti-pluralism, anti-egalitarianism, etc., like the puritans assume, why are there a lot of verses in the Qur'a> n and practices of Muh} ammad's life that teach tolerance, freedom, democracy, equality, etc and command Muslims to live peacefully with others and to respect human beings. 37 The existence of "the two faces of Islam" including the ambiguous texts of the Qur'a> n is due to the fact that the revelation process was dynamic in accordance with particular historical contexts and special backgrounds. The Qur'a> n itself "came down" within the particular context of circumstances (asba> b al-nuzu> l). So, it makes sense at all if the verses of the Qur'a> n provide different meanings from one another or simply said, they are "ambiguous" in meaning.
Based on the above description, therefore, I will support the idea that Muslims should take only the positive side of Islamic tradition and texts and set aside the negative ones. Islam has to be placed only in its universal values and humanistic spirit. Examples of positive aspects of Islam are as follows: when Muh} ammad could conquer Mecca, a main town in Arabia at the time, that was known in the Islamic history as Fath} } u Makkah ("the Victory or the Openness of Mecca"), Prophet
Muh} ammad forbad his followers to destroy local tribes and other nonMuslims and allowed them to practice their beliefs and faith based on some verses of the Qur'a> n that support and obligate all Muslims to live peacefully with believers. In addition, the Qur'a> n promises that "all those who believe-the Jews, the Sabeans, the Christians-anyone who believes in God and the Last Days, and whoever does good deeds, will have nothing to fear or regret" (Q.S. 5:69). The Qur'a> n also advises Muslims to coexist with the Jews and Christians: "We believe in God, and in that which has been revealed to us, which is that which was revealed to Abraham and Ismail and Jacob and the tribes of Israel, as well as that which the Lord revealed to Moses and to Jesus and to all the other prophets. We make no distinction between any of them; we submit ourselves to God" (Q.S. 3:84) . 38 This is precisely what makes the idea of "monotheistic pluralism."
On the contrary, the verses of the Qur'a> n that contain teachings of intolerance, violence, anti-democracy, inequality, slavery, misogyny, and so on must be reexamined and deconstructed just like Luther had done with his "95 Theses." Without deconstruction the equal relationships, the efforts of peace building, as well as egalitarian and humanistic theological transformation could have never been manifested in the religious community's life. Deconstruction of "the problematic texts" is significant in order that the puritans/radicals do not use such texts to legitimize their acts. This approach is based on the fact that classical Islamic tradition also recognizes the concept of naskh (literally elimination or abrogation) in which the texts that are not suitable with the spirit of contemporary society can be ignored. Therefore, Muslims should elaborate on this concept to erase the problematic texts that are out-dated and are opposite to the spirit and worldviews of contemporary societies and contradict to the spirit of democracy, pluralism, heterogeneity, peace movements and other universal values. The approach is in-line with the Arabian sayings: "Khud} ma> s} afa> wa utruk ma> qadhara" (Take the clean things and leave the dirty ones).
In this context, Muslims have to be able to distinguish the doctrinal aspects of Islam from its traditions or cultures, the teachings that provide resources for building human solidarity from those which are otherwise, those which reflect Arabian cultural influence from those which do not. Islam is rational so that any teachings which oppose human rationality should be avoided. Muh} ammad himself had said: al-di> n huwa al-'aql la> di> na li man la> 'aqla lahu ("Religion/Islam is the reason, there is no religion for those who have no reason). This means that a Muslim should use his or her rational power to analyze and to rethink all aspects of Islamic teachings. Islam is also contextual, in the sense that its universal values have to be translated into particular contexts-Arabian, Malay, Asian, American, Latino, African, Canadian, Russian and so on. Thus, any aspects of Islam which reflect 38 See Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Qur'an: Text Translation and Commentary (Elmhurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, Inc., 1987) . Examples of what non-Arab Muslims do not have to take into account because they are merely expression of a particular Islam in local Arabia, are the hija> b (female head covering), polygamy, the amputations of hands (for theft), retaliation (for death or injury), stoning to death (for adultery), obligatory beards and gowns of particular styles. Then, examples of Islamic teachings mentioned in the Qur'a> n that should be ignored by Muslims because they represent the opposite of universal humanistic principles, are the concept of dhimmi> , unequal gender relationships (e.g. male-female, heterosexualhomosexual, etc.), mysoginism, slavery, the truth of claim and other teachings that have the potential to destabilize the world and threaten human relationships and human security. In my opinion, there is no "law of God", as most Muslims understand that concept. What do exist are general principles and universal values which in the classical Islamic tradition of legal study are called maqa> s} id al-shari> 'ah, that is, the general goals of Islamic law. The values include the protection of religious freedom (h} ifz} al-di> n), reason ('aql), property (ma> l), the family, and honor (nasl and 'ird} ). How these values are translated into any given historical and social context is something Muslims must work out for themselves through ijtiha> d (intellectual endeavor). I argue that Islam is "a living organism" that evolves concerning the pulse of humankind's development Islam is not a static monument that was carved in the 7 th century and thereafter as a beautiful statue may not be touched by the hand of history. Only through ijtiha> d or critical thinking can Islam be living wherever and whenever it is. Islam must be seen as, to borrow Mohammed Arkoun's term, "a dynamic verb" instead of "a static noun." 39 Once more, those teachings and texts have to be disclosed (read: deconstructed). The religious texts in Islamic tradition can be deconstructed through a socio-historical approach. This approach combines two methods: the historical and the sociological method. Norman Gottwald stated that the two methods are different but complementary to each other. 40 Historical method embraces all the methods of inquiry drawn from the humanities (e.g. literary criticism, form criticism, tradition history, rhetorical criticism, history of religion, etc). Sociological method includes all the methods of inquiry proper to the social sciences (e.g. anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, etc.). Both methods are significant to understand the dynamic of early Islam. Both methods are compatible for reconstructing early Islam and thought. Historical study of early Islam aims at grasping the sequential articulation of Muslims' experiences including Muh} ammad as a "guider" and the rich variety of its cultural products. Sociological study of early Islam aims to hold the typical patterns of human relations (e.g. relations among tribes of Arabia) in their structure and function. 41 In a socio-historical approach, each community abandons some assumptions which have influenced the collective perception of the Muslim community. The premise is that the Qur'a> n as "God's word" (I deliberately use quotation because I fundamentally do not believe in the "word of God") is not to be seen as supra historic, or outside of history. A historical approach understands the "sacred texts" or scriptures as profane, temporal and impermanent because the Qur'a> n is an outcome of human cultures-a historical product. Thus, there is no reason to sacralize, dogmatize, and idolize it. Bibliolatry, borrowing T.H. Huxley's term in Science and Hebrew Tradition, that is, "idolizing process toward scriptural texts," is a dangerous view because it can bear fanatical attitudes and blind-behavior. The most dangerous enemy of Islam today is "bibliolatry" or dogmatism, a kind of closed conviction that a particular doctrine is an infallible medicine for all human problems and ignores the fact that human life is continually evolving. There is no sacred and holy text. The real one is a "sacralized text". Instead, there is a long and complex historical process at work through which texts become "scientia sacra" -both sacred and mythic. At the beginning, the Qur'a> n was an oral tradition. Codification and canonization of the Qur'a> n occurred in the time of the caliph `Uthma> n, far after the death of Muh} ammad. In the hermeneutical studies, there is a serious problem in the process of moving from oral tradition to a written one in religious traditions. 42
Conclusion
Such deconstruction can serve to build a transformed religious community. But this "religious transformation" can only occur if each community is prepared to "detach itself" from the Text's hegemony over the critical logic of the Muslim community. Instinctively, the text has been slithering beneath our consciousness, influencing every step of religious Muslim community behavior: do this, and don't do that. We have acted like robots controlled by a remote control. As long as our movement is positive and "humanist" there is no problem with the Muslims' approach to religion. The problem emerges when our actions are destructive and violent. Though the text has been considered sacred, containing positive "movement-principles" (for instance, the text regarding freedom/liberation, equality, the teaching of love, social solidarity, emancipation, universal brotherhood, etc.) it also contains negative "movement-principles" (such as slavery, doctrines of supremacy, gender domination, "jihad", etc). Thus, the negative "movement-principles" of the text creates narrow-minded humans who exploit other humans in the name of religion and God. To deconstruct the Qur'a> n, first of all, Muslims should view the Qur'a> n as a "dynamic discourse" or in the Nas} r H{ a> mid Abu> Zayd words in his Mafhu> m al-Nas} , "al-Qur'a> n ka al-khit} a> b," and not as a "sacred text" (AlQur'a> n ka al-nas} s} ). 43 In the 23-year revelation process, the Qur'a> n was also a dynamic phenomenon, full of dialogues, and following a takeand-give mechanism, as well as receive-and-reject one. Indeed, as asserted by al-Zarkashi> in the al-Burha> n fi> 'Ulu> m al-Qur'a> n, the Qur'a> n "came down" to Muh} ammad only in the shape of ideas while wording 
